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Abstract
Over the last decade, the production of artificial intelligence (AI) knowledge and technologies has stood
out from all other sectors of the economy. In the pursuit of AI evolution, some data and algorithms (i.e.,
models, the software side of AI) are typically freely available as open source by its authors and sponsors,
who value academic impact and scientific reputation. Lately, the open science dynamics of the AI industry
has produced a fierce competition for breakthroughs, which depend on firm-specific knowledge—obtained
through investments on research and development (R&D)—and expensive technology (respectively the
human and hardware sides of AI) to expand the field. While studies on investments in AI have favored the
role of nations and governments, the aggregate role of large companies has been anecdotal. This paper
tracks global trends in R&D expenditure by key players in the AI knowledge field for 10 years
(2012-2021), a decade that has produced AI to transform society. The findings show a highlyconcentrated industry, suggesting the formation of knowledge and technological clusters (that we relate to
a broad concept of oligopoly). Future research in the “periphery” (competing companies and independent
or publicly funded research institutions) would be at the service of this oligopoly or would be limited to
the resources offered by the oligopoly.
Keywords
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Introduction
The world has approximately 214 million companies (Statista, 2022). Industry, agriculture, commerce
and services in all domains and of all sizes compete for a share of the market by means of differentiating
to gain relative advantage over competitors. Knowledge has been of great concern for leveraging
differentiation and, ultimately, competitiveness (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996), particularly firm-specific
knowledge instead of publicly accessible knowledge, since the proprietary nature of firm-specific
knowledge makes it more difficult to absorb, imitate or replace (Wang et al., 2016). Technology is the
main means currently available for acquiring and exploiting firm-specific knowledge (Nayak et al., 2022),
as in the case of big data analytics (BDA) (Dahiya et al., 2021) and artificial intelligence algorithms (AI)
(Fredström et al., 2021) supported by the ever-growing progress in computing power (higher capacity and
availability, and lower costs). Some authors even identify a “race to AI” (e.g., Smuha, 2021, p. 3) leading to
a “winner-takes-all” phenomenon (Ding & Dafoe, 2021, p. 192).
Technological innovations, such as BDA and AI have deserved attention also from governments
and the academy regarding not just AI and organizational performance, but also ethical issues, regulation,
and governance (e.g., Kerr et al., 2020). An example of governmental concern regarding AI is the AI
Watch Report, launched by the European Commission (EC) in December 2018, aiming “to monitor the
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development, uptake and impact of AI for Europe” (Benetta et al., 2021, p. 1). On the academic side, a
related example is the AI Governance: A Research Agenda Report, published by the Future of Humanity
Institute (FHI) at the University of Oxford, which highlights risks related to potential “labor displacement,
inequality, an oligopolistic global market structure” promoted by a “potent general purpose technology”
such as AI (Dafoe, 2018, p. 1).
The FHI report expresses concern about the formation of an oligopolistic global market structure,
as a result of AI-intensive applications (Dafoe, 2018), but for us it does not make clear whether this
concept implies or not an oligopolistic global technological/AI structure. An oligopolistic global market
structure exists when “[o]nly a few firms can invest the high capital and R&D [research and development]
expenditures and accumulate the experience required to keep pace with constant technical iterations”
(Ding & Dafoe, 2021), which lead us to suppose that an oligopolistic global technological/AI structure
follows the same path, i.e., the accumulated capacity of investments in R&D determines the level of AI
firm-specific knowledge and competitive performance. The relationship between investments and
competitive performance is a well documented subject in the information technology (IT) literature,
which illustrates and supports our earlier supposition. For example, IT as a knowledge-intensive industry
uses IT capabilities—know-how to combine and recombine IT resources—to create competitive
advantages (Bharadwaj, 2000). As resources cannot offer competitive advantages by themselves (Cohen &
Olsen, 2013), knowledge, skills and partnerships are examples of capabilities that explain superior
performance of firms (Fink, 2011) and could explain advances in AI.
While studies on investments in AI have favored the role of nations and governments, the
aggregate role of large companies has been anecdotal (e.g., Newman, 2017; Webb, 2019). So, the literature
supposes an oligopolistic global technological/AI structure, as a result of intensive R&D, but to the best of
our knowledge there is no reported evidence of such a phenomenon, investigated through theoretical
lenses. This finding leads us to the following research question: To what extent do business companies
that invest heavily in firm-specific knowledge development differentiate themselves from those that do
not, constituting an oligopoly1? Answering the research question contributes for theoretical and applied
knowledge by demonstrating the concentration of knowledge and formation of technological oligopolies.
The study also adds to the literature on KBV regarding how much advantage is needed for sustainable,
competitive advantage.
This study is organized as follows. First, we discuss the theoretical framing of competitive
advantage, the knowledge-based view as a theory for explaining such advantage, and the role of AI and
machine learning developments in that theoretical framing. Second, we present our methodological
approach that uses secondary data on R&D investments to answer the research question. Third, we
discuss the results along with implications for theory and practice, limitations and future studies. And
fourth, we present conclusions about the AI oligopoly and its potential consequences.

Literature review and theoretical positioning
Competitive advantage and the knowledge-based view of the firm (KBV)
The resource-based view of the firm (RBV) explains a firm’s survival through its capacity of achieving
differentiation in a competitive environment (Barney, 1991). In the light of the RBV, competitive
advantage is achieved through cost reduction (e.g., scale gains, exclusive sources of raw materials, or
cheap work force, for example), or because of specific attributes of the firm’s product or process (e.g.,
trademarks, patents, network service, or distribution channels) (Newbert, 2008). The RBV assumes that
organizations (1) are composed of heterogeneous resources (the resources are not evenly distributed
among all players); (2) will have superior performance if they have resources that are valuable, rare,
difficult to imitate, irreplaceable or of difficult mobility; and (3) the source for competitive advantage
exists inside the organization. That is, some sort of heterogeneity is required for promoting sustainable
competitive advantage.
In their search for differentiation, firms develop organizational capabilities, that is, a set of
activities based on the development, flow, and exchange of information, carried out systematically, which
allow an organization to take advantage of its resources (or a combination of them) and generate valuable
outcomes (Degravel, 2011). As such, the RBV expects certain stability in a competitive sector, enough to

1

We assume a broad sense for the term, as an industry or knowledge field dominated by a small number of large
players.
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give firms time to change and adapt (Teece et al., 1997). However, in rapidly changing and unpredictable
situations, knowledge emerges as the main source of competitive advantage, by promoting the
transformation of organizational capabilities into dynamic capabilities, “the organizational and strategic
routines by which firms achieve new resource configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and
die” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000, p. 1107).
The knowledge-based view of the firm (KBV) extends the RBV, considering that the need for
dynamics capabilities is inherent to organizational context, and that knowledge is a superior resource,
able to combine/recombine other resources, including those external to the organization (Bharadwaj,
2000; Grant, 1996). The assumption of knowledge as a relevant organizational asset implies a strategic
decision and further actions to promote curiosity to learn, adaptation/improvement of what has been
learned and exploitation to obtain benefits (absorptive capacity; Henard & McFadyen, 2006). The KBV
thus explains the acquisition of competitive advantage by means of absorptive capacity, that is, knowledge
integration into organizational and dynamic capabilities (Zahra et al., 2020).
The KBV has been used to analyze R&D investments and competitive advantage in critical areas
such as corporate social responsibility and sustainability (Ullah & Arslan, 2022), cybersecurity (Mongeau
& Hajdasinski, 2021), and emerging economies and national competitiveness (Ge & Liu, 2022). However,
it is not just any sort of knowledge that promotes competitive advantage. Firm-specific knowledge has
more potential for differentiation among competitors than publicly accessible knowledge (Barney, 1991;
Grant, 1996), as the proprietary nature of firm-specific knowledge makes it more difficult to absorb,
imitate or replace (Pereira & Bamel, 2021; Wang et al., 2016).
Firm-specific knowledge is composed of (1) expertise and skills of a firm’s employees, manifesting
through “common language, relationships, or a sense of identification that exists among departments
within a firm”, and increasing on the basis of employee involvement with prior related projects (Mayer et
al., 2012, p. 3); (2) the levels of financial slack and of human resource slack available for R&D (Wang et
al., 2016); and (3) external sources and partnerships (Cai et al., 2019). Slack resources are desirable, since
they exceed the minimum necessary for organizational operation and as such work as “a buffer resource”
in times of change (Yiu et al., 2020, p. 1210).

Artificial intelligence
Seen from an academic perspective, artificial intelligence (AI) is a field that emerged in the late 1940s and
early 1950s in seminal propositions on how to determine whether a digital computer can think like a
human (Turing, 1950) and on how a computer can play human-designed games, “something of the nature
of judgement, and considerable trial and error, rather than a strict, unalterable computing process”
(Shannon, 1950, p. 256). Shortly after, those propositions began to appear in practice, as described by
Samuel (1959), when he managed to program a digital computer “to behave in a way which, if done by
human beings or animals, would be described as involving the process of learning”, that is,
“[p]rogramming computers to learn from experience” (p. 211).
Broadly said, AI depends on the ability of machines to learn from experience, examples or
training, which has been more recently defined as “[a] computer program is said to learn from experience
E with respect to some task T and some performance measure P, if its performance on T, as measured by
P, improves with experience E” (Mitchell, 1997, p. 2). Nowadays, the concept of AI encompasses (1) inputs
(raw data, parameters), models (rules, heuristics, accuracy) and outcomes (predictions, decisions, and
trustworthy) (e.g., Kaur et al., 2020); (2) technology and resources (hardware, software, data quality,
security) (e.g., Hu et al., 2021); and (3) the influence on the context/environment (social, ethical,
economic impacts) (e.g., Kerr et al., 2020; OECD, 2019).
Machine learning (ML) has been the main strategy for reaching such a high level of AI (Lui et al.,
2021) and has evolved from simple pattern recognition through biological neuronal emulation
(Rosenblatt, 1960) to recognition, identification, analysis, and classification of complex—and maybe
incomplete—contents, such as ancient texts (Assael et al., 2022). The profound developments in ML—
nowadays under the umbrella term deep learning (DL)—has been carried out in countries with immense
capacity to invest in research and infrastructure (Liu et al., 2021), with the support of research centers
and universities (Shao et al., 2020).
However, while studies on investments in AI have favored the role of nations and governments,
the aggregate role of large companies has been anecdotal (e.g., Newman, 2017; Webb, 2019). For us, the
state of the art in the field seems to have been defined by companies like Alphabet (Google), which
develops TensorFlow, a powerful ecosystem for ML available and in use by many industries (Pang et al.,
2019). The same goes for Microsoft and GPT-3, a natural processing language (NLP) tool that has been
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established as the standard for computer vision (Edwards, 2021), also available and in use by many
industries. As a final example, Meta (also known as Facebook) delivered its SEER self-supervised
computer vision model, which can learn without data curation and labeling (Ramanathan et al., 2021),
both well-known pre-processing tasks in conventional computer vision training.

Hypothesis
The dominance over an industry favors the over-concentration of power, either through the accumulation
of knowledge (Marimon & Quadrini, 2011) or due to ownership of the most efficient resources (Arnosti &
Weinberg, ahead of print), what imposes barriers to competition. Using the same argument, we could
hypothesize that cutting-edge AI development is the domain of those companies that have the most
efficient hardware and data in greater volume and variety. Assuming investments in R&D and in
equipment as a proxy for AI investments (Yiu et al., 2020; Benetta et al., 2021), we propose:
H1: There is a significant difference in investments in R&D and equipment between groups of
companies that invest more in R&D.

Method
R&D investments have been adopted as a predictor of operational capability in high-tech firms (Yiu et al.,
2020), and predictor of AI investments in the European context (Benetta et al., 2021). We followed the
same approach, using the dataset from European Commission (EC)—specifically the industrial R&D
investment scoreboard (IRI)—on the 2,500 companies that invested the largest sums in R&D worldwide
each year. The dataset was accessed on March, 2022, comprising data from 2011 to 2020 fiscal years,
published as 2012 to 2021 EC-IRI report.
As for data analysis and hypotheses tests, we chose to adopt cluster analysis and Mann-Whitney U
tests. Cluster analysis is a ML technique which dispenses on labeled data (non-supervised training) (Lai et
al., 2019) and offers a way to find patterns on raw data, grouping lines/observations with common
characteristics (Li et al., 2020). Among the multiple classes of clustering algorithms available
(hierarchical, partition, grid, and density-based, for example) we opt for the density-based one, which
stands out by not assuming normality, does not depend on the shape of data, and deals well with noise
(Lai et al., 2019).
The density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise (DBSCAN; Martin et al., 2001)
implements a density-based clustering, and has been considered a standard in its class (Pelka, 2018;
Fredström et al., 2021). DBSCAN does not require the a priori definition of the number of clusters to be
find (Li et al., 2019)—as in the case for k-means—, instead it requires two other main parameters: Eps (the
radius of a centroid, given it in an arbitrary unit of measure) and MinPts (minimum amount of data
points reachable within the centroid radius).
Estimating both central parameters for the DBSCAN algorithm has been a challenge (Braune et
al., 2015), to the point where many try to automate this estimation (e.g., Hou et al., 2016), while others
claim that this is a decision that is often based on the researcher's experience (Lai et al., 2019), through an
iteractive approach (Soni & Ganatra, 2016), sensitivity analysis (Fredström et al., 2021), or domain
knowledge and heuristics (Schubert et al., 2017). Our initial data analysis suggests that the biggest
investors are outliers. Unlike the traditional treatment (exclusion of outliers), in this research outliers are
the focus of the study, hence the need to include them in the subsequent analyses. So, our approach
followed Braune et al. (2015) and Soni & Ganatra (2016), assuming the outlier threshold as determinant
for both parameters. Considering the presence of companies with massive investments in R&D and Capex
in data, we accept each one of those main companies as a cluster itself. Following such a rationale,
MinPts=1 (at least 1 company/cluster) and Eps=2.5 (the outlier threshold radius—Euclidean distance—
identified through iterative attempts). After finding clusters, we applied Mann-Whitney U tests to verify
statistical significance of median differences, as a non-parametric alternative to two independent sample
T-test.

Sample
Data from the 2021 edition of the EC-IRI report includes 779 companies based in the US, accounting for
31% of the total; 597 Chinese companies (24%); 401 EU companies (16%); 293 Japanese companies (11%);
and 430 from the rest of the world (17%). The numbers are nearly the same for all other editions/years of
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that report. The dataset is formed by tuples with 19 features (attributes), for example: Company, country,
R&D, R&D one year growth, and Capex (capital goods). The dataset was pre-processed (file name, column
label and data type standardization) and previously analyzed for distribution, missing values, and outliers.
We chose R&D investments (EC_RD, henceforward) and Capex (EC_Capex, henceforward) as the
features of interest for our analyses, considering that investments in R&D, specially made by tech
companies, has been related to AI investments (Liu et al., 2021). No missing values found for EC_RD.
Missing values found for EC_Capex (128 cases on average per year/report; 5.1%) were filled with zeroes,
considering that the most meaningful feature (EC_RD) was complete. Missing values issues are usually
handled by marginalization (discard data with missing values) or imputation (fill in missing values)
(García-Laencina et al., 2010). The average rate of EC_Capex missing values (5,1%) exceeded the
threshold for marginalization (<=5%) in which there is no loss of information (ibidem). Outliers were
evaluated with the Mahalanobis distance (Riani et al., 2009) with a .001 significance level.

Results
Data distribution is abnormal (leptokurtic), and shows at least two segments: data concentration and data
dispersion (outliers). A leptokurtic shape “is a widely accepted” issue in financial data (Premaratne &
Bera, 2005, p. 169), includes Poisson, logistic and t-student’s distributions, and suggests the prevalence of
outliers (Bossaerts, 2021). Further analysis on outliers identifies that the current biggest R&D investors
are companies like Alphabet, Huawei, Microsoft, Samsung, Apple, and Facebook. Unlike the traditional
treatment (exclusion of outliers), in this research outliers are the focus of the study, hence the need to
include them in the subsequent analyses.
Figure 1 shows an example of cluster analysis applied on the dataset for the year 2021. The same
procedure (cluster analysis) was repeated for each year, and the results suggest a pattern for a region of
high concentration at the bottom/left and a region of dispersion at the top/right, highlighting each cluster
through different colors.
The silhouette coefficient (SC) vary from .858 to .936. SC is a well-known measure of fitness for
clustering (Pelka, 2018), assumes values from the interval −1 to 1, and “[t]he higher value means the
better assignment of objects into clusters”(Řezanková, 2018, p. 3).

Figure 1. Cluster analysis, 2021
Note: dotted line suggests a threshold between ordinary investors and outliers
Table 3 shows the clustering objects for 2021, as an illustration of how companies are clustered
together. While 4,488 companies comprise a single cluster (#5), 12 other companies form eight clusters.
Cluster objects

#0

Alphabet

#1

Huawei Investments & Holding
Apple

#2

Microsoft

#3

Samsung Electronics
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#4

Facebook
Volkswagen
Intel

#5

Roche
Johnson & Johnson
Daimler
+ 4,485 other companies

#6

Toyota Motor

#7

PetroChina

#8

Saudi Arabian Oil
China Mobile

Table 3—2021 clusters and companies
Table 4 shows an aggregation of clustering for all years (2012-2021), obtained through the
following steps, for dataset k, year y:
•
1st order clustering using the algorithm DBSCAN identified a number of cky clusters;
•
each cluster C is composed by j objects o, following the form Ck,y = {o1, …, oj};
•
2nd order clustering identified objects oj often composing clusters cky (supposedly that
who invest heavily and permanently in R&D).

Company

Year (+2000)
21

20

19

18

17

16

15

14

13

12

Samsung electronics

3

3

1

0

2

1

1

1

1

0

Intel

4

1

2

1

1

2

3

3

3

2

Toyota Motor

6

5

5

5

5

4

5

5

4

0

PetroChina

7

7

7

7

7

7

6

7

6

5

Volkswagen

4

1

2

1

0

0

0

0

0

2

Microsoft

2

1

2

1

1

2

2

2

Alphabet (Google)

0

0

0

1

1

2

3

Apple

1

1

2

1

4

5

Huawei investment & holding

1

2

3

2

Saudi Arabian Oil (Aramco)

8

8

7

Facebook

4

1

China Mobile

8
6

5

6

Royal Dutch Shell

8

6

8

8

8

7

6

AT&T

8

6

Daimler

4

Exxon Mobil

8

8

8

7

7

Chevron

8

8

8

7

6

General Motors

6

6
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Company

Year (+2000)
21

20

19

18

17

16

Gazprom

8

Total

8

15

14

12

8

8

Nissan Motor

5

3

General Electric

5

3

NTT

5

4

Petrobras

8

13

7

8

8

8

Novartis

4

Roche

4

Table 4—2012-2021 clusters and companies
Notes: Cells contain the internal ID of each cluster; Colors represent “discretionary clusters”, grouped by
chronological assignment to DBSCAN clusters and quantity of assignments; Year of data publication
(fiscal year+1)
Table 4 shows that (1) there is a group of five companies that invest heavily and permanently in
R&D and capital goods (Samsung Electronics, Intel, Toyota Motor, PetroChina, and Volkswagen). These
are companies in the industries “Software & Computer Services”, “Electronic & Electrical Equipment”,
“Technology Hardware & Equipment”, and “Automobiles & Parts”; (2) there is a group of seven
companies that have been gradually increasing investments in R&D and capital goods (Microsoft,
Alphabet, Apple, Huawei, Aramco, Facebook, and China Mobile). This group mainly has companies in the
“Software & Computer Services” and “Technology Hardware & Equipment” industries, with a member of
the “Oil & Gas” industry; and (3) there is a third group of 14 companies that have been gradually reducing
(when compared to the other groups) investments in R&D and capital goods. The third group consists
mainly of companies in the “Oil & Gas”, “Automobiles & Parts”, and “Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology”
industries. The existence of these three 2nd order clusters suggests that there is an ongoing movement (in
the big R&D scenario) that can be explained by (a) occupation of empty spaces—ICT companies occupying
open investment spaces by companies from other industries (mostly “Oil & Gas”) –; or (b) increased
pressure from ICT companies that “pushes” behind companies from other industries, in the race for AI. In
any case, we found that the ICT industry is already quite present in R&D investments and tends to expand
its presence.
To assess hypothesis H1 we analyzed each year independently, composing 10 sub-hypotheses for
the original hypothesis. Such a decision considers that objects oj (companies) often compose distinct
clusters cky with different participation in the amount of R&D invested year after year. In order to segment
groups for comparison (the aim is to assess the difference between the medians of two samples), groups
were formed by cluster objects that are beyond and below the threshold between ordinary investors and
outliers, as illustrated in Figure 1. This procedure was repeated for each year. The Mann-Whitney U tests
show that all sub-hypotheses had significant statistical support (p<.001).

Discussion
We assume that investments in R&D and capital goods (Capex) made by tech companies are suitable
proxies for investments in AI, based on related works (e.g., Benetta et al., 2021; Yiu et al., 2020). This has
been a reasonable strategy as there is no specific published data on AI investments. Even considering
number of patents or registration of new products could be more suitable variables to measure firmspecific knowledge, they are not suitable for measuring AI investments. For example, the AI Watch
technical report from the European Commission Joint Research Centre uses OCDE data “to monitor the
development, uptake and impact of AI for Europe” (Benetta et al., 2021, p. 1), but the results are an
estimate, as there are difficulties in computing patents and AI-related training courses (adopted as AI
investment proxies). Even so, we recognize the limitations of considering investments in R&D as a proxy
for investments in AI, since a large part of this investment could not be related to AI. In any case, our
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study differs from others in that we use player-level data, while related work uses aggregated data by
country, region or industry.
We found a significant difference between clusters of companies that we called ordinary investors
and outlier investors (H1). In 2021, for example, we found 4,488 companies comprising a single cluster
(#5), while 12 other companies form eight clusters. This is the default data pattern for other years on the
dataset. This finding supports the proposed conceptual model, especially in the relationship between R&D
and capital goods investments, and AI oligopoly. This is in line with Marimon & Quadrini's (2011)
argument that the dominance over an industry favors the over-concentration of knowledge; and with
Arnosti & Weinberg’s (ahead of print) argument that the ownership of the most efficient resources
interposes barriers to competition.
Such findings suggest the existence of an AI oligopoly, composed by few companies with high
capacity for investment. The AI oligopoly could be illustrated through a singularity metaphor, as in the
case of a black hole, where the density and gravity are so high that even light cannot escape its attraction,
at a point of no return: the singularity. Our metaphor goes through a differential singularity: an
insurmountable distance—at least during a certain period of time—between those who compete and those
who are beyond competition. In this scenario, a set of players is said to be singular when the sum of firmspecific knowledge already available by a firm plus its capacity to invest in new firm-specific knowledge
development surpasses the sum of publicly available knowledge on that subject plus the capacity of other
players to invest in firm-specific knowledge. The Expression 1 synthesizes this.
(e1) Sit if (SKAit + NSKit) > (∑PK + ∑1nNSK)
S, differential singularity
i, firm index
t, specific period of time
SKA, firm-specific knowledge already available
NSK, capacity for new firm-specific knowledge development
PK, publicly available knowledge on that subject
n, number of other players

Conclusions
This study makes a number of contributions to the RBV and KBV literature. First, it points out an
apparent explainable limitation of both theories: how much advantage is needed to keep a sustainable
advantage, while still keeping it competitive? That is, a sustainable competition, with players still able to
effectively compete, not just watching the contest? Second, it proposes a metaphor for AI oligopoly,
suggesting the differential singularity concept to be considered in RBV and KBV studies as the point at
which a threshold of differentiation is achieved that becomes impossible to be reached by others. From
the differential singularity, we have an oligopoly able to dictate the rules of the industry and market,
without being bothered by any competition. If this makes sense, a third contribution of this study is not to
recommend investigating the performance of oligopolistic organizations in the light of RBV, KBV or any
theory of the firm that presupposes the possibility of competition. That is, this study proposes a limit of
theoretical explanation, which differs from recent systematic literature review on RBV and KBV that
points out future trends in the development of theories (e.g., Pereira & Bamel, 2021), but does not
anticipate theoretical limits.
This study also contributes to the literature on AI governance and regulation as it offers empirical
evidence of a highly-concentrated AI industry—suggesting the formation of knowledge and technological
clusters. Implications seem to go beyond the economic impacts of oligopolies and other issues we can
currently devise, since AI has been changing human life in unexpected, profound ways.
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